A Synopsis of Recent Florida Cases by unknown
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
6-1-1948
A Synopsis of Recent Florida Cases
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
A Synopsis of Recent Florida Cases, 2 U. Miami L. Rev. 305 (1948)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol2/iss4/10
A SYNOPSIS OF RECENT FLORIDA CASES
A BRIEF review of the decisions of the Supreme Court
of Florida published during the quarter ending Sep-
tember first, is proposed in this note.' In the editorial
process of selecting cases for comment, it is necessary to
prepare preliminary studies of all of the decisions of this
court, among others; but the process of selecting for com-
ment only those cases which present matters of the great-
est novelty and importance, tends to obscure the fact that,
in a growing jurisprudence like Florida's, the great major-
ity of cases establish noteworthy precedents. It is also
possible that many cases should never have been permit-
ted to occupy the time of an overburdened court. A gen-
eral study of the court's business may uncover the con-
ditions which make that situation possible. Accordingly,
an attempt has been made to bring together preliminary
studies of all the decisions published during the last quar-
ter, imitating for that purpose the general pattern of the
invaluable "Annual Survey of American Law"'
In the present issue, the plan to examine all decisions
on matters of pleading and procedure was not carried out;
but it is hoped in future issues to increase the scope of the
survey in that direction, and to include the federal courts.
In the interest of brevity, dependence has been placed on
the use of titles to introduce topics as well as to indicate
the framework of the analysis. The basic division is into
three topics: Public Law, Private Law, and Adjectival
Law.
i This comment covers the decisions appearing in the advance sheets
from May 27, 1948, to and including August 26, 1948. This includes all
of Volume 35 and pages 1 through 392, Volume 36, Southern Reporter
(Second Series).
2 New York University School of Law, New York, N. Y. The first
volume appeared in 1942, and the series is now complete through the
1947 annual volume.
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PUBLIC LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. A number of novel and im-
portant applications of settled rules of Constitutional Law
were made during this period. Some of them deal with the
basic definition of state power and the broad general lim-
itations thereon found in the doctrine of the separation of
powers and the concept of due process. Others construe
the special limitations on governmental power found in
the state constitution upon the legislative process and upon
certain classes of legislation.
Power of the state. The view is generally taken that,
while the federal government is one of enumerated powers,
and all governmental action which does not stem from
some express or implied aspect of these powers, is ultra
vires, the power of the state is complete unless it is limited,
expressly or impliedly, by the state or federal constitution.
In other words, the state may do whatsoever is not pro-
hibited. This rule was applied in a case3 where a statute
authorizing the state to convey public lands to the federal
government free of charge, was challenged. The court found
that no constitutional mandate specifically prohibited the
authorized acts and sustained the statute. The rule seems
to have been misapplied in another case" in which the court
said that "since the decision in MeCulloch v. Maryland,
the doctrine of implied powers has been as much a part
of the law of this country as the written law itself." The
rule of McCulloch v. Maryland was invoked to justify a
reasonable extension of federal power beyond those spec-
ifically enumerated, and has no application to a case of
state power, which is plenary. Again, in an action6 to en-
join the submission of the issue of city-county consolidation
3 Watson v. Caldwell, 35 So. 2d 125 (Fla., 1948). The Attorney General
instituted suit to cancel deeds between the Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund and the State Board of Education exchanging lands
so as to vest title to those lying within the designated park area in the
Trustees, who alone had powed to convey to the United States.
4 In re Warner's Estate, 35 So. 2d 296 (Fla., 1948). A county judge
sitting in probate adjudicated a lien for attorneys' fees in favor of
local counsel upon the distributive share of a non-resident legatee.
5 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S., 1819).
6 City of Miami Beach v. Crandon, 35 So. 2d 285 (Fla., 1948).
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to the voters of Dade County, in which the contestants
urged that county officials would be required to perform
unauthorized acts, the court ruled that in the absence of a
specific constitutional prohibition on the exercise of legis-
lative powers, it must be assumed that the power exists.
Separation of powers. The rule that the legislature may
not impose administrative or legislative functions on the
judicial branch, was exemplified in the test of the new
statute7 authorizing actions in rem to quiet title to land.
Pursuant thereto, a person in possession of land, deraign-
ing a good title of record, sought to confirm his title by
removing unknown clouds against unknown claimants. The
Supreme Court ruled that the circuit court could not take
jurisdiction, as there was no controversy presented for ad-
judication. Grave doubts were expressed9 as to the con-
stitutionality of a statute which would require the court in
criminal cases to instruct the jury as to the penalty fixed
by law for the offense charged, on the theory that this
would interefere with the proper discharge of the judicial
function; but the question was properly avoided by recourse
to a rule of construction which treated the statute as di-
rectory and not mandatory. The court also found, in anoth-
er case,1" that there is inherent in the courts, as an incident
of the judicial power, the power to regulate matters of
procedure, at least where the legislature has not acted.
This inherent power (the court denominated it "implied")
was deemed sufficient to permit a county judge sitting in
probate proceedings, to adjudicate an attorney's lien for
fees against the distributive share of a nonresident claim-
ant. The proposition is startling, and the logic of the court's
opinion is none too clear. The unwillingness of the judicial
branch to interefere with the conduct of legislative proces-
ses, found expression in a case1 where the court refused to
join the Florida Citrus Commission, a purely rule-making
7 C. 24099, Laws of 1947; F.S.A. §§ 66.28 et seq. For comments upon
the statute, with historical analysis, see J. M. FLOWERS, Real Property
Laws of 1947, 2 Miami L. Q. 21, 22.
8 Key v. All Persons Claiming Any Estate, 36 So. 2d 366 (Fla., 1948).
9 Simmons v. State, 36 So. 2d 207 (Fla., 1948).
10 In re Warner's Estate, 35 So. 2d 296 (Fla., 1948). This case is also
discussed above. See note 4.
"t State ex rel. Stewart v. Mayo, 35 So. 2d 13 (Fla., 1948).
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body, in an action- of mandamus against the Commissioner
of Agriculture, whose duty it was to enforce those rules.
Delegation of power. The question whether the legisla-
ture, in proposing a constitutional amendment, may make
approval by the electorate of a particular county a condi-
tion precedent to the submission of the amendment to the
general electorate, which is in effect a delegation to the
electorate of a single county of the power to submit an
amendment, was involved in the consolidation case2 noted
above. The court found that this did not violate any specific
limitation of the Constitution but overlooked the specific
limitations of the Second Article; and found the measure
to be in accord with provisions" requiring certain types
of local laws affecting counties to be submitted to a vote
of the electorate in such county.
Rules of construction. Certain rules of construction ap-
plied in cases in Constitutional Law, grow out of an ap-
preciation of the basic function of the court, to which is
given no veto power, in passing upon the constitutionality
of statutes. The application of one of these, the rule that
of alternative constructions, the one which will avoid grave
doubts of constitutionality is to be preferred, has already
been noted.' 4 In another case,'5 the Supreme Court dis-
approved a holding by the circuit court that a statute was
unconstitutional when there was an alternative ground for
reaching the same decision. In the city-county consolidation
case,' 6 the court refused to pass upon issues which would
not arise until after the county electorate approved sub-
mission of the amendment. Subsequent events have proved
the issue moot.
Due process. The general limitations of due process were
applied in a case 7 involving jurisdiction to tax, in which
12 City of Miami Beach v. Crandon, 35 So. 2d 285 (Fla., 1948). For a
general discussion of the statute. see JoHN F. WILMOTT, The Truth About
Gity-County Consolidation, 2 Miami L. Q. 127.
13 Fla. Const. Art. UT, § 21.
14 See note 9 supra.
15 Frink v. State ex rel. Turk, 35 So .2d 10 (Fla., 1948).
16 See note 12 supra.
17 State ex rel. Seaboard Air Line v. Gay, 35 So. 2d 403 (Fla., 1948).
The court did not specifically refer to the due process clause of either
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it was held that the state could not tax nonresident bond-
holders of a railroad corporation, whose bonds were secured
in part by a mortgage on Florida properties, under the
statutes imposing an intangible personal property tax. It
was assumed that the privilege of recording the mortgage
might be taxed, but the court asserted that taxes can be
lawfully levied only in the express method pointed out by
statute. The court also recognized 8 that a resident might
be assessed an intangible personal property tax on an in-
terest in trust funds established and administered in anoth-
er state by nonresident trustees. The due process clause of
the federal constitution was invoked in the case, 9 pre-
viously mentioned, holding the cumulative method to quiet
title to land unconstitutional in certain aspects. The court
held, in an alternative decision, that the notice published
did not conform to standards of due process. This point of
the case is not developed, however, and in view of the fact
that substituted service of a like character has been ap-
proved in cases20 where the court did have a contro-
versy and jurisdiction of the res, as for example where
a known cloud is to be removed but the claimant is un-
known, it would be unfortunate if a precedent has been
established on this point.
Freedom of speech. In recent years the federal supreme
court has broadened the concept of the freedom of speech
to include peaceful picketing. That this advances the in-
terest of the individual at the expense of society further
than previous concepts of free speech, has been noted, since
"the picketer's audience is frequently an importuned one;
and when it is, the picketer's right is an interference with
the rights of other people, not a complement thereof, as is
the right of persons addressing those who come to hear
State or Federal Constitution, but it should be noted that parallel federal
cases turn upon that point. McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327 (1944).
is Mahan v. Lummus, 35 So. 2d 725 (Fla., 1948).
19 see note 8 supra.
20 For authorities holding like service in proceedings in rem to comply
with the requirements of due process, see J. M. FLOWERS, Real Property
Laws of 1947, 2 Miami L. Q. 21.
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them.2 " The Supreme Court bowed to federal rulings, by a
divided court, in a case2 which illustrates the importunity
of picketing nicely. Persons not employed in a laundry at
the time, picketed the establishment and advertised by press
and radio, stating that employees of the laundry were on
strike. A few employees were afraid to return to work,
some customers hesitated to risk their shirts, and general
annoyance was caused tending to interefere with the reg-
ular operation of the plant. It was shown that a labor'
organizer had engineered this "strike" in order to unionize
the plant and to become collective bargaining agent for its
employees, who were then not members of the union. The
circuit court granted an injunction; but the Supreme Court
reversed. It must be remembered that nothing in these
decisions deprives the plaintiff of an action for damages;
prior restraints alone are curbed in the interest of pre-
serving democratic processes. The fact that the injunction
was granted only after the court found legal remedies to
be inadequate, does not alter the picture. The court avoided
a determination of the constitutionality of certain Florida
labor statutes,23 by holding them inapplicable when no em-
ployees were involved in the strike. The challenged section
condemned participation in a strike not authorized by a
majority vote of the employees to be governed thereby. The
ultimate decision will require the courts to decide whether
the non-striking employees' right to work must yield in
the interest of preserving free institutions, to the striking
minority's freedom of speech.
Special limitations in the state constitution: One subject,
clearly expressed in the title. The requirement24 that each
law shall embrace but one subject, clearly expressed in the
title, was applied in two cases. In the first,25 taxes were
imposed by municipal ordinance on sales of fuel oil under
a statute which authorized municipalities to tax sales of
electricity, gas, or any competing service. Because there
21 CORWIN, The Constitution and What it Means To-day (Princeton,
10th ed., 1948), p. 197.
22Whltehead v. Miami Laundry Co., 36 So. 2d 382 (Fla., 1948).
23 C. 21968, Laws of Florida, 1943, F.S.A. §§ 481.01 et seq.
24 Fla. Const. Art. ITT, § 16.
25 City of Orlando v. Johnson, 36 So. 2d 209 (Fla., 1948).
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was no reference in the title to fuel oil or competing ser-
vices, the ordinance was disapproved in declaratory judg-
ment proceedings. In the second case,26 a statute authoriz-
ing a county to erect an office building outside the county
seat, providing for a bond issue, and prescribing the duties
of public officers with respect to the new offices, was held
not to be legislation on more than one subject,
Income tax. The prohibition on income taxes was held 7
to preclude the assessment of an intangible personal prop-
erty tax on a life estate held in trust. A life estate in a
trust is in fact a mere right to receive income. In view of
the settled rule that a gift of income for life creates a life
estate, the decision seems to be sound. It is indicated,
however, that -a power to revoke, if vested in the income
beneficiary, would destroy the immunity; but where the
trustee in his sole discretion may apply the corpus to sus-
tain the income beneficiary in want, the beneficiary's inter-
est in the corpus is a contingent remainder, not subject to
taxation.
Creating municipal indebtedness without vote of the
freeholders. The state constitution prohibits8 counties,
districts and municipalities from issuing bonds unless the
issue has been approved in an election in which a majority
of the freeholders who are qualified electors, vote. This
limitation has been narrowly construed so as to permit free
issue of bonds which are not to be serviced by the imposi-
tion of taxes. As the result of a current decision,29 it does
not require an election to approve bonds which are to be
serviced from excess fees resulting from services rendered
by county officials. These services are governmental in
character, not local or municipal. Likewise moneys appro-
priated by the state may be used to service such an issue.
Other provisions which might have been construed as
violative of the constitutional limitation were stricken by
the court below, and this phase of the order was not ap-
pealed. However, in another case30 the freeholders approved
26 State v. Pinellas County, 36 So. 2d 216 (Fla., 1948).
27 Mahan v. Lummus, .35 So. 2d 725 (Fla., 1948).
28 Fla. Const. Art. IX, § 6.
29 State v. Pinellas County, 36 So. 2d 216 (Fla., 1948).
30 Fletcher v. Board of Public Instruction, 35 So. 2d 121 (Fla., 1948).
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a resolution which violated other constitutional limitations3'
as to date of maturity. The resolution was amended to
conform with the constitution after the vote of approval,
and this was held to cure the defect. The court reasoned
that the vote of the freeholders was required only for the
purpose of approving the amount of the issue, and that the
maturity date could be fixed by the school district in its
discretion. This reasoning appears to be as illogical as to
say that a debtor need not be concerned when his debts be-
come due, so long as he knows the total amount.
Jurisdiction of county judge sitting in probate. Over the
contention that constitutional provisions32 giving the county
judge jurisdiction to discharge the duties usually pertain-
ing to courts of probate, did not permit the court to take
jurisdiction of the claim of a distributee's attorney against
his client for fees and to.adjudicate a lien on the distribu-
tive share, the court ruled33 that the court had "implied
power" (under the rule of McCulloch v. Maryland) to do so.
While exception has been taken to the reasons assigned by
the court, it is not unusual to find courts of probate exer-
cising broad powers of a court of equity in all matters
connected with the settlement of estates.3
Other limitations. In proceedings35 to validate bonds of
Pinellas County, an attack was made on a statute which
permitted the county to erect a public building and conduct
branch offices at St. Petersburg, which is not the county
seat, in order to accommodate the large concentration of
population at that point. The attack was based on so many
constitutional issues that one may suspect passion to have
outweighed judgment. As a result it has been held that
such a statute does not violate the following constitutional
limitations: duties and fees of county officers may not be
fixed by local law ;16 mandatory requirements for the pass-
31 Fla. Const. Art. XII, § 17.
32 Fla. Const. Art. X, § 17.
33 See note 10 supra.
34 For the modern concept of the jurisdiction of probate courts, see
Model Probate Code of the Probate Law Division, American Bar Associa-
tion, published in SIMES and BASYE, Problems in Probate Law, Ann
Arbor, 1946.
35 State v. Pinellas County, 36 So. 2d 216 (Fla., 1948).
36 Fla. Const. Art. III, § 20.
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age of legislation when the legislative journal does not
disclose irregularities;" a prohibition on the removal of
county seats;3" and a requirement that all county officers
shall hold their respective offices and keep their official
books at the county seat.39
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. The cases decided during this
quarter manifest the development of a well defined concept
of the means, purposes and scope of the judicial review of
administrative action. In the last analysis, this is the foun-
dation of a system of administrative law. This develop-
ment has taken place by common law processes, as is usual-
ly the case, through the statement of the rules which govern
the issuance of the writs of mandamus and certiorari
against executive and administrative agencies ;40 but the
Supreme Court with increasing frequency bases its de-
cisions on broad principles of administrative law rather
than on the rules governing the use of the particular writ.
Mandamus. The use of'the writ of mandamus to deter-
mine bona fide disputes between citizen and state over the
interpretation of acts of the legislature, is illustrated in
two cases. In the first of these,41 taxes were paid under
protest. Mandamus was held to be the proper means of
securing a judicial determination of the controversy and
securing refund. It should be noted that the statute auth-
orized taxes to be paid under protest and also authorized
refunds of taxes found to have been overpaid. Without the
first of these, the taxpayer might have been treated as a
mere volunteer, and without the second, there might have
been a problem of immunity from suit. Where the legisla-
ture made state lands liable for local taxes, the proper
means to enforce payment was held-' to be mandamus,
37 Fla. Const. Art. IT, § 17.
39 Fla. Const. Art. VII, § 4.
19 Fla. Const. Art. XVI, §4.
40 The development of administrative law in Florida through the use
of the extraordinary common-law writs, has been the subject of a
series of comments appearing in this volume. See pp. 181, 229, 233,
and post.
41 State ex rel. Seaboard Air Line v. Gay, 35 So. 2d 403 (Fa., 1948).
42 State ex rel. South Florida Conservancy District v. Caldwell, 35
So. 2d 642 (Fla., 1948).
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since the ordinary processes would have been ineffectual
against the state.
Limits on power to issue mandamus. Judicial control of
administrative action is subject to two broad limitations in
constitutional law: first, that the court cannot thereby
direct or interdict legislative action; and second, that the
court cannot interfere with executive action which involves
discretion and is not simply ministerial. The first rule was
illustrated in a case43 against the state Commissioner of
Agriculture, already noted, to compel the employment of
certain tests in the inspection of citrus fruit. The com-
missioner moved to quash the alternative writ asserting
that the Florida Citrus Commission, which had power to
make the rules governing inspections, was the proper party.
The court refused to quash on this ground. The second rule
was illustrated44 in a refusal to issue an alternative writ
against an election commissioner who refused to change
registration of party affiliation on presentation of a writ-
ten proxy. No regulation other than the ad hoc ruling in
the case appears to have been made. The legislature had
given the commissioner power to adopt methods of pro-
cedure not inconsistent with the statute. The court refused
mandamus, holding that the reasonableness of a rule can-
not be tried on that writ; but the case may be treated as
one of executive discretion. While the writ of mandamus
may not be used to review the propriety of the exercise of
legislative or executive discretion, it may be used to deter-
mine whether or not that discretion exists. In another case, 45
the writ of mandamus was used to restore an employee
retired because of age under regulations of a state admin-
istrative agency, the court finding that the agency had no
power to formulate such a rule. The distinction between
this case and the previous one lies in the fact that the
authority to make rules, rather than the wisdom of the rule,
was challenged. In a parallel case, 46 where administrative
43 State ex reZ. Stewart v. Mayo, 35 So. 2d 13 (Fla., 1948).
44 State ex rel. Norman v. Holmer, 35 So. 2d 396. The court treated
this as a case of quasi-legislative power vested in a commission.
45 State ex rel. Hathaway v. Smith, 35 So. 2d 650 (Fla., 1948).
46 State ex rel. Stone's Liquor Stores v. Vocelle, 35 So. 2d 650 (Fla.,
1948).
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discretion to issue a liquor license was challenged, the court
determined that the function was purely ministerial, and
directed the license to be issued.
Jurisdiction to issue mandamus. In one case,47 the court
indicated that mandamus could issue only at the suit of a
party having a personal or property interest to protect;
but said that a citrus grower resident in the state has a
sufficient interest to challenge the way in which maturity
tests were conducted by the Commissioner of Agriculture.
It found however, that the statutes permitted the test being
used to be substituted where no complaint was made, and
therefore held that the suit was prematurely brought be-
cause no demand on the commissioner was shown. In
another case41 it was ruled that injunction proceedings,
which are in effect the complement of mandamus, can be
brought against a state administrative body in any county
where an invasion of personal or property rights is threat-
ened. In cases of mandamus, however, where performance
of duty rather than prevention of official acts, is the end of
litigation, suit must be brought where the administrative
body is seated. The court makes what appears to be a
,useless distinction between actions commenced chiefly to
secure interpretation of rules and those brought primarily
to secure judicial protection from threatened invasion. The
injunction could be sought just as well at the seat of gov-
ernment.
Certiorari to review quasi-judicial action. The use of the
writ of certiorari to review administrative acts of a judic-
ial character was shown in a case" involving the revocation
of a liquor license. The court reviewed the record and
found that the evidence supported the decision to revoke.
In such cases it is generally held that the court may reverse
for errors in law, among which is included the sufficiency
in law of evidence to support the findings of fact. In this
47 State ex rel. Stewart v. Mayo, 35 So. 2d 13 (Fla., 1948). The court
read the several sections of the statute as permitting the use of an
alternative method until challenged by the grower and dismissed the
writ because such a challenge was not shown.
48 Smith et al. v. Williams, 35 So. 2d 844 (Fla., 1948). Prohibition to
challenge the jurisdiction of the circuit court.
49 Marino v. Vocelle, 36 So. 2d 375 (Fla., 1948).
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case, one judge dissented, saying that evidence tending to
show adulteration did not prove a case of illegally refilling
bottles.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Legislative control: consoli-
dation. The plenary character of the control which the legis-
lature exercises over municipal corporations is illustrated
in three recent cases. In one, 5' the legislature having pro-
posed a constitutional amendment to consolidate Dade
County with certain municipalities therein, an attack was
made on the legislative power. The court declared the
power of the state legislature to be plenary unless specific-
ally limited by some constitutional provision. The act was
also challenged on the narrower ground that it would re-
quire the county commissioners to perform an illegal act;
but it appears from the court's answer that county officers
perform such duties as the legislature assigns. In another
case,5 ' the legislature was found to have power to authorize
a county to establish branch offices at a place other than
the county seat without violating the specific constitutional
prohibition on removal of the county seat. In still another
case, 2 where the legislature consolidated school districts,
after bonds of one had been validated but before delivery,'
the court held that the bonds might be delivered and would
constitute an obligation of the consolidated district.
Municipal indebtedness. The power of a municipality to
borrow money is subject to constitutional limitations.,'
Two cases dealing with the necessity of a vote of the free-
holders, and the extent to which it may be avoided, are dis-
cussed above.5 4 Apparently the increase of indebtedness
through consolidation, as in the case last discussed, does
not violate this constitutional prohibition. Other powers.
The several counties and school districts are not necessarily
limited by county lines in the performance of their func-
50 City of Miami Beach v. Crandon, 35 So. 2d 285 (Fla., 1948). For
the advantages which sponsors of the bill had hoped to gain, see JOHN
F. WILMor, The Truth about City-County Consolidation, 2 Miami L. Q.
127.
5' State v. Pinellas County, 36 So. 2d 216 (Fla., 1948).
52 Fletcher v. Board of Public Instruction, 35 So. 2d 121 (Fla., 1948).
53 Fla. Const. Art. IX, 1 6.
54 See notes 29, 30 supra.
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tions. It was found 5 that a school district could acquire a
campsite in an adjoining county for recreational purposes.
The case also approves of a much broader view of the scope
of the school program, in which "training the character
and emotions is as important as training the mind" (per
Terrell, J.). The charter powers of a city do not include
power to levy taxes on the purchasers of the services of
public utilities, although a tax on the seller might be per-
missible.3
Tort liability of municipalities. Two cases involve the
tort liability of municipalities. In the first,57 a boy was in-
jured while operating a defective printing press during the
manual training program at a public school. In the other,
a person was injured by a falling coconut frond while sit-
ting on a bench in a public park. In the first case, the court
ruled that since the school district was performing govern-
mental functions, it enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit;
while in the second case, it was assumed that the city would
be liable if negligence could be shown. The court refused to
apply the rule of res ipsa loquitur to the behavior of coco-
nut fronds, and in the absence of some proof that the city
knew, or should have known, of the particular dangerous
frond, dismissed the action. While the basis of distinction
between the two cases is not entirely clear, it appears to rest
on the peculiar character of each type of municipal body,
those at the county level enjoying sovereign immunity be-
cause they perform "governmental" functions, and those at
a lower level, not. If cases on charitable trust furnish any
standard, the operation of schools and parks are both in
the public interest. Neither is a proprietry interest, such
as exists when a state owns, bottles and sells the medicinal
waters of a famous spring. 9 The distinction must there-
fore lie in the character of the tortfeasor, not in the par-
55 Scott v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, 35 So. 2d
579 (Fla., 1948).
56 City of Orlando v. Johnson, 36 So. 2d 209 (Fla., 1948); cf. Smith
v. City of Miami, 34 So. 2d 544 (Fla., 1948).
57 Bragg v. Board of Public Instruction of Duval County, 36 So. 2d 222
(Fla., 1948).
55 Lisk v. City of West Palm Beach, 36 So. 2d 197 (Fla., 1948).
59see State of New York v. U. S., 326 U. S. 572 (1946). New York
must pay federal tax on mineral waters with respect to bottled product
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ticular function being performed. In the school district
case, the court expressed an opinion that the public and
not the individual should bear the loss, but deferred to the
legislature on this question.
PUBLIC LANDS. A decision 0 has already been noted to the
effect that the state, by act of legislature, may waive the
exemption of public lands from local taxation. A surprising
decision was rendered in a case6' where a county sought a
mandatory injunction against a landowner to remove
barricades across a road which had been used by the public
for more than fifty years. During that period, the county
had never taken official cognizance of the road, and the
evidence showed that the use was merely permissive. The
evidence is not summarized in the opinion, but it would
seem that the court has failed to recognize that the county
sues not in its own right but in that of the public, and
furthermore, that adverse possession is to a certain extent
permissive, otherwise a lost grant cannot be presumed.
LICENSES. The problem whether a license is a mere priv-
ilege, revocable in the discretion of the issuing authority,
or whether the licensee has such a personal or property in-
terest in his license that courts will intervene to determine
whether or not it has been properly revoked, seems to have
been settled last year in the Paoli case'2 Two cases were
decided during the current quarter involving liquor licenses,
a class of license formerly regarded as conferring a mere
privilege, in which the court's action was based on the
theory that the licensee has a property interest. In the first
of these cases,63 the court found that the state Beverage
Department had not acted in accord with the commands of
the legislature, and granted an alternative mandamus di-
recting renewal. A licensed liquor store sought to move next
of state-owned Saratoga Springs, because not a governmental but rather
a proprietary function.
60 Watson v. Caldwell, 35 So. 2d 125 (Fla., 1948).
61 Pinellas County v. Roach, 36 So. 2d 364 (Fla., 1948).
62 State ex rel Paoli v. Baldwin, 31 So. 2d 627 (Fla., 1947). The
case was noted, with different conclusions, in 2 Miami L. Q. 54, and
1 U. of Fla. L. R. 296.
63 State ex rel. Stone's Liquor Stores v. Vocelle, 35 So. 2d 649 (Fla.,
1948).
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door. There were more licenses outstanding than the law
allowed, and the department refused. The statute restrict-
ing the number, however, permitted the renewal at the
same location of licenses previously granted. In the second
case, 64 the department was authorized to revoke the license
of a dealer for refilling bottles. The evidence tended to
show adulteration. While the court split on the legal suf-
ficiency of the evidence, the significant fact about the case
is the assumption of jurisdiction to review based upon the
theory that the department performed a quasi-judicial
function.
TAXATION. In the field of taxation, two cases already
noted for their constitutional law aspects, held that the
state may not levy an intangible personal property tax on
mortgages of Florida real property held by nonresidents,
although it might tax the privilege of recording;" and that
the state may not levy an intangible personal property tax
on the owner of a life estate in trust funds." Land dedi-
* cated to public use is exempt from taxation, and may be
exonerated in a suit to cancel.6 This exemption is one which
the legislature is privileged to waive with respect to lands
owned by the state, according to another holding." In a
suit to cancel taxes,69 it was alleged that there were irreg-
ularities in the assessment and that the power was exer-
cised in an arbitrary manner. The court approved an
order of the chancellor dismissing the bill, in effect ruling
that irregularities and arbitrary. action are not the subject
of a collateral attack where the power to tax is acknowl-
edged.
CIVIL SERVICE. Two cases of interest to civil servants
64 Marino v. Vocelle, 36 So. 2d 375 (Fla., 1948).
65 State ex rel. Seaboard Air Line v. Gay, 35 So. 2d 403 (Fla., 1948).
66 In r6 Warner's Estate, 35 So. 2d 296 (Fla., 1948).
67 McCaskill v. City of Homestead, 36 So. 2d 272 (Fla., 1948).
68 Watson v. Caldwell, 35 So. 2d 125 (Fla.. 1948).
69 McCaskill v. City of Homestead, 36 So. 2d 272 (Fla., 1948). On
this point, there Is no intimation as to the reason of the court for
sustaining the action of the lower court in dismissing, after hearing,
the amended bill. It is possible that the effect of the ruling is simply
that whether or not the assessment was arbitrary, was a question of
fact for the chancellor.
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were decided during the quarter. In the first of these,7 0
the court ruled that where an administrative agency of the
state was given power by statute to establish regulations
governing appointments, promotions, and demotions based
upon efficiency and fitness, and terminations for cause,
it did not have power to make a rule retiring all em-
ployees at seventy. Old age is not inefficiency per se,
Terrell, J., ruled in an opinion remarkable for its restraint.
The legislature may, of course, grant authority to make
such rules. In another case,7 the legislature had directed
local school districts to pay teachers rehired after pre-
vious service, in twelve equal installments. The statute was
construed to require that payments begin with the fiscal
year, although the school sessions did not begin until two
months later. Prior to the passage of the statute, teachers
had already signed contracts for pay to begin with the
school session. The case turned entirely on questions of
construing the legislative intent; but two rules of civil
service law are illustrated: first, that entitlement to public
pay is an incident of the office vesting on appointment, and
it does not depend on the performance of services; and
second, that lawful entitlement cannot be waived by con-
tract.
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS. The right of organized
labor to force an election upon the employees of a nonunion
industry by means of a fictitious strike, seems to have been
established in a recent case as incidental to the freedom of
speech protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
limitation upon the power of the courts to protect the un-
organized worker and management is only upon the power
to enjoin the strike or the false advertising; but since the
injunction is predicated upon a finding that the remedy at
law is inadequate, it would seem that the injured party is
given a Hobson's choice. The case is discussed above for its
Constitutional Law aspects.
ELECTIONS. Two cases involving the interpretation of
election laws should be noted. A statute which gives absen-
70 State ex rel. Hathaway v. Smith, 35 So. 2d 650 (Fla,, 1948).
71 Weiss v. Leonardy, 36 So. 2d 184 (Fla., 1948).
72 Vhitehead v. Miami Laundry Co., 36 So. 2d 382 (Fla., 1948).
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tees a right to vote, being in derogation of the common law,
must be strictly complied with. This rule was involved in
the refusal to honor absentee ballots for a municipal elec-
tion where the elector's affidavit did not correspond exact-
ly with the language of the statute.3 Election officials hav-
ing been given power to make rules to carry into effect the
purposes of the election laws, an ad hoc ruling that a per-
son must appear in person to change party registration,
was held to be beyond judicial scrutiny." This last de-
cision ended the hope of the so-called "Progressives" to
have their candidate appear on the ballot without recourse
to the state legislature.
CRIMES AND OFFENCES. In the field of criminal law, there
were several cases construing the statutory definition of
certain crimes, which will be described herein, and several
raising points in the law of evidence, which will be discus-
sed below. It was noted that, while the crime of obtaining
money under false pretences was not embraced within the
common law definition of larceny, the Florida statute on
larceny75 is so drawn that it comprehends that offense."
Accordingly, the offense may be charged either as larceny
or false pretences under different statutes. An information
charging that the accused "burned" and "procured to be
burned" a dwelling house does not charge two inconsistent
offences so as to be duplicitous.7 Conviction under a munic-
ipal ordinance making it an offense to maintain a gambling
device, cannot be based on evidence which showed that the
accused took and paid bets on horse races actually being
run at various tracks. 8 Evidence showing that accused
manufactured moonshine whiskey is legally sufficient to
support a conviction for evading taxes under the state
beverage laws, provided the information charges that the
beverage is one upon which a tax would be imposed if it
had been manufactured in accordance with the provisions
73 Frink v. State ex re7. Turk, 35 So. 2d 10 (Fla., 1948). The statute
required an affidavit that the voter expected to be absent from the
county, while the one submitted stated only absence from the city.
74 State ex tel, Norman v. Holmer, 35 So. 2d 396 (Fla., 1948).
75 F. S. 1941, § 811.01.
76 McDowell v. State, 36 So. 2d 180 (Fla., 1948).
77 Miles v. State, 36 So. 2d 182 (Fla., 1948).
78 Cooper v. City of Miami, 36 So. 2d 195 (Fla., 1948).
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of the law. 9 Because of the use of this peculiar phrasing,
prior inconsistent holdings were distinguished. It would
also seem that evidence of adulteration is legally sufficient
to sustain a conviction for refilling liquor bottles. In one
case the defendant was convicted of receiving money know-
ing it to have been embezzled. Defendant called daily at
the place of employment of the embezzler, and over a period
of years received $95,000 to be played on Bolita. All win-
nings were played back. The court ruled that this evidence
was not sufficient to show that defendant knew,' that
the money was embezzled. With so much gold are the streets
of this brave, new world paved! Each of the above cases
seems to be treated as one of defining the statute under
which the information is laid, without any attempt to state
and apply rules of construction of general utility.
PRIVATE LAW
CONTRACTS AND COMMERCIAL LAW. In the field of com-
mercial law, there were two cases involving brokers' com-
missions for obtaining purchasers for real property. Both
cases turned principally on questions of pleading; but both
illustrate the rule that the terms of the broker's contract
are largely a question of fact for the jury, the customer's
liability depending upon the precise undertaking. 2 The
second case involved the liability of an incompetent not
under guardianship. 3 While such a contract may be void-
able, it is necessary to restore the status quo in order to
avoid it. Since, in a case of this type, the broker has per-
formed his part of the contract, that cannot be done. The
court assumed that the contract was beneficial to the in-
competent; but this appears to be on the theory that since
the incompetent has had the benefit of the broker's ser-
vices, the contract was beneficial. Suppose the price for
which the property was offered was so inadequate as to
evidence incompetency? It is suggested that this case may
stand for the proposition that even if the contract to sell
be voidable, the broker has earned his commission. The
79 Harris v. State, 36 So. 2d 372 (Fla., 1948).
so See Marino v. Vocelle, 36 So. 2d 375 (FlIa., 1948).
Si Monteresi v. state, 35 So. 2d 582 (Fla., 1948).
82 Sater v. Stenor, Inc., 35 So. 2d 584 (Fla., 1948).
83 Perper v. Edell, 35 So. 2d 387 (Fla., 1948).
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broker need not effect a sale: he must simply produce a
purchaser ready, willing and able to purchase on the terms
specified, if the seller prevents completion. Financial ability
does not mean that the purchaser have cash in hand, but
sufficient credit. The use of reports by a credit rating
agency to prove financial ability was approved in this
case.
EQUITY. During the last quarter, the rule that specific
performance of a contract to convey or lease real property
cannot be awarded where the contract is indefinite, was
illustrated in a case where the evidence, construed most
favorably to the plaintiff, showed an agreement to lease
at a rent "to be agreed upon by the parties." 4 Where the
terms of a contract can be proved with certainty, and that
which is entered into does not comply with the agreement
of the parties, equity will order reformation; but this is
not possible with respect to contracts to convey real prop-
erty unless the preliminary agreement has been reduced
to writing. An exception to this rule is made where there
has been part performance. This may occur when the pur-
chaser has taken possession of the land and made expendi-
tures. This exception was illustrated in a recent case where
the operator of a gasoline service station entered and made
expenditures on a property controlled by a distributing
company."5 The general manager of the lessor made prom-
ises to the new tenant which were not authorized. In such
a case, the principal is bound by the apparent authority of
the general manager. In another case," the court seems
to have assumed that a contract by a builder and developer
to build a house on his land and sell the land so improved,
reserving to the purchaser three days after completion of
the house to reject it, would not be specifically enforceable.
Constructive Trusts. A constructive trust may be en-
forced in equity whenever a person standing in a fiduciary
relationship to another, uses his position to make a profit.
As a general rule, the beneficiary of such a trust does not
need to show a loss; but has an election to affirm the trans-
84 Topper v. Alcazar Operating Co., 35 So. 2d 392 (Fla., 1948).
85 Orange State Oil Co. v. Crosby, 36 So. 2d 273 (Fla., 1948).
86 Lehman v. Goldin, 36 So. 2d 259 (Fla., 1948).
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action and claim the profit, or to disaffirm and receive
restitution. The extent to which the beneficiary may affirm
and take the profits is examined in a recent caseY Having
been engaged to purchase Blackacre, and having received
earnest money from his customer, a real estate broker found
that Blackacre could be purchased only as a part of White-
acre. He bought Whiteacre, but finding an opportunity to
sell the entire tract at a profit, he did so and returned the
earnest money. The lower court held that he must account
for the profit on the whole transaction; but the Supreme
Court was of opinion that he need only account for so much
of the profit as could be attributed to a sale of Blackacre.
In these cases, there is no res until property is acquired in
breach of fiduciary duty. Whether or not there was breach
of fiduciary duty as to all of Whiteacre should depend on
whether or not its acquisition resulted from the execution
of the original engagement, which was largely a question
of fact to be decided by the court below.
In recent divorce cases, a doctrine has been developed
that property held in the sole name of husband or wife may
be impressed with a trust and be taken into account in
directing a settlement, if it can be shown that the other
party has contributed to the acquisition or enhancement
in value of the property. In this way, it has appeared pos-
sible for courts of equity to declare and enforce a principal
of community property, treating all property acquired by
either member of the family team during coverture as the
property of both. If there has been a movement in that
direction, it has been halted by a recent case. It must be
shown specifically wherein the wife has contributed to the
acquisition or enhancement of the property: theories of
"division of labor" within the family are not enough. In
the particular case, the husband owned a drug store at the
beginning of the ill-fated marital venture. The wife worked
about the store, sold ham sandiches and cosmetics; but
the chancellor did not find that this had contributed to the
enhancement of the value of the business. Possibly the case
was decided according to the common law principle, that a
woman's place is in the home.
87 Tucker v. Lacey, 35 So. 2d 724 (Fla., 1948).
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Resulting Trusts. When property is purchased in the
name of one person with money furnished by another, there
is a resulting trust to the person who furnished the money.
This is a matter of presumption, which may be rebutted
by showing that a gift was intended, or that the money was
furnished in discharge of an obligation, or was loaned. A
gift is presumed where title is placed in the name of the
wife of the person furnishing the price. That this pre-
sumption is rebuttable is shown in a recent case;89 but
what evidence is sufficient in law to support the finding of
a chancellor that it has been rebutted is not indicated. This
case and many others demonstrate the futility of review-
ing the record to determine whether or not the findings
of fact are supported by sufficient evidence without stat-
ing, at least "epigrammatically," 0 the effect of the evi-
dence. As it stands, the case is valueless as a precedent.
In another case, where a daughter to whom property had
been conveyed without consideration by her father, dis-
claimed any personal interest therein but said that she held
it in trust, this was regarded as sufficient to rebut the
presumption of a gift.91
REAL PROPERTY. Important cases involving rights in
land will be found under the preceeding heading. Two
other cases, already discussed for public law features,
should be reviewed here. In the first of these, it was held
that where a county had never taken official cognizance
of a road used by the public for more than fifty years, it
would not enjoin the owner from erecting a barrier.9 2
Some language in the opinion is disturbing. It is said that
the evidence showed "permissive" rather than "adverse"
user. If there was other evidence than the fact that the
public had used the road, the court did not summarize it.
If the court means to say that when an owner of land
stands back and does not protest for fifty years, user is
not adverse, the court is overlooking the fact that title by
S8 Welsh v. Welsh, 35 So. 2d 6 (Fla., 1948).
59 Lovejoy v. Lovejoy, 36 So. 2d 192 (Fla., 1948).
90 See Terrell, J., In M. J. Carroll Construction Co. v. Smith, 35 So. 2d
385, where the expression "stated in epigram" is used.
91 Kirk v. Kirk, 36 So. 2d 171 (Fla., 1948).
92 Pinellas County v. Roach, 36 So. 2d 364 (Fla., 1948).
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prescription is based upon a presumed grant: that if there
were no right, the owner would have protested. Adverse
possession is therefor always permissive in fact, and it is
only by proving an express license less than the grant of a
fee simple that the presumption of a complete license can
be rebutted. If the case means that the county cannot sue in
the right of the public to assert an easement acquired by
the public, then this criticism is unfounded; but the lan-
guage of the court is consistent only with the first alterna-
tive. The second case holds that the cumulative method of
quieting title to land, provided by the last legislature, does
not provide a means of removing unknown clouds against
unknown claimants." The new statute was passed upon the
theory that the old did not provide a procedure in rem
whereby this very thing could be done ;94 but it has now
been found that the limitation is constitutional. It is now
apparent that the security of titles which this act was
designed to achieve can now be attained only by adopting
a full registry system, or in the alternative, by requiring
private enterprise to offer that security in such a way that
the public will be protected. In other states, title insurance
companies are required to maintain reserves subject to the
supervision of the insurance commissioner or a similar
administrative agency, and where the abstract system is
in use, abstracting companies are required to be bonded
and are made liable by law to any person relyfing on the
abstract, whether or not there is privity of contract.
TRUSTS. Resulting and constructive trusts, which arise
by operation of law, were discussed above. An important
decision holding that a life tenant or income beneficiary
of a trust may not be required to pay an intangible per-
sonal property tax, discussed above for its constitutional
and tax law implications, deserves note here.97 While it is
generally held that a settlor may not create a valid spend-
93 Key v. All Persons Claiming any Estate, 36 So. 2d 366 (Fla., 1948),
94 See J. M. FLOWERS, Real Property Laws of 1947, 2 Miami L. Q. 21,
25 (1947).
95 See TRUSLE, Extension of Idability of Abstracters, 18 Mich, L. R.
127 (1919) and Note, 1 U. of Fla, L. R. 70 (1948).
96 See under '.'Equity: Constructive Trusts."
97Mahan v. Lummus, 35 So. 2d 725 (Fla., 1948).
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thrift trust for himself, and may not, as statutes are now
written, avoid taxes by reserving a right to revoke or a
power to appoint, the principal case shows that, where a
simple life estate is reserved, it is no different in the hands
of the settlor than it would be in the hands of any donee.
In the particular case, the trustee was required to invade
corpus; but the court pointed out that since the exercise
of this power depended upon a future contingency, this was
a contingent remainder, and therefore not taxable. We
note with pleasure the court's definition of a contingent
remainder in view of the earlier case of Krissoff v. First
National Bank of Tampa," which we have criticized else-
where.9 The decision holding a school district immune from
suit where a student was injured while operating a print-
ing press in the course of instruction, 0 calls attention to
the fact that there is yet no holding on the tort liability of
charitable trusts, such as schools and hospitals, endowed
and not operated for profit. There is a division of auth-
ority both as to result and reasoning in the cases on this
point in other jurisdictions, but the older view accorded
these public enterprises the same immunity that is given
the school district. Language used by the court, reflecting
hostility to the immunity of the school district, may fore-
cast a view that the trust will be liable: a view which will
be unpopular with those who solicit annually for community
chests.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES. A single case involving the inter-
pretation of the Probate Law is replete with historical ref-
erences.'0 ' Where a family allowance of one year's support
is paid to the widow as a Class four claim, 1 2 the amounts
received are not to be charged against dower. The court
found that this allowance supplements the quarantine,
which the widow enjoyed at common law. While this allow-
ance is treated as an expense of administration, and the law
provides that the widow's dower shall be free of all ex-
98 32 So. 2d 315 (Fla., 1948).
99 See note, 2 Miami L. Q. 240 (1948),
100 Bragg v. Board of Public Instruction of Duval County, 36 So. 2d
222 (Fla., 1948),
101 In re Gilbert's Estate, 36 So. 2d 213 (Fla., 1948).
102 F. S. 1941, § 733.20.
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penses of administration,"' the court held that it would be
inequitable to charge the entire amount against the other
beneficiaries. The decision thus affords construction of the
dower provisions which might not be apparent from the
language used. Statute of non-claim. The statute of non-
claim in Florida operates to bar all claims which are not
filed within the prescribed period, and, if disallowed, are
not litigated promptly. In this respect, it differs from the
statutes of many states, which permit claims not barred
by the general statute of limitations to be asserted at any
time before final distribution. 14 The operation of the Flor-
ida statute is illustrated by a recent case in which it was
held that where there is a substantial difference between
the claim as filed and the claim as proven, and the time to
file and litigate has expired, the claimant must suffer
nonsuit."o"
MORTGAGES. With boom-time conditions prevailing once
again in Florida, mortgagees who were thought to have
lost their security in the Great Hurricane, are now found
before the courts in two suits to foreclose. In both cases,
possession of the property was in the holder of a tax deed.
In one case, the tax deed was invalid, but the purchaser
had occupied for fifteen years, had made extensive im-
provements, and had paid much in taxes.10 6 The mortgage
was given in 1916 and came due in 1923, seventeen years
before the commencement of the suit to foreclose. While the
statute of limitations did not bar the claim, the court held
that laches did. In the other case, the tax deed was found
to be valid, but the purchaser had made doubly certain by
taking a quit-claim deed from the mortgagor.' 7 This fact
was alleged to evidence fraud and to vitiate the protection
of the tax title; but the court held that there must be spec-
ific proof of collusion at the tax sale in order to permit
the tax deed to be set aside as against the mortgagee. In
another case, two mortgages given by the same mortgagor
1o F. S. 1941, § 731.34.
104 See SiMES and BASYE, Problems in Probate Law (Ann Arbor,
1946) p. 325; Model Probate Code, § 285.
1G5 Sawyer v. Hinton, 35 So. 2d 294 (Fla., 1948).
106 Sims v. Palmer, 35 So. 2d 841 (Fla., 1948).
107 Travis v. Mayes, 36 So. 2d 264 (Fla., 1948).
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to the same mortgagee, were foreclosed in a single suit.-1 0
Each contained provisions for an attorney's fee of $100
plus ten per cent of the recovery. The court below held
that the sum of $100 plus ten per cent must be taken for
both mortgages, but the Supreme Court added the other
$100.
CORPORATIONS. One case involving a problem in corpora-
tion law,. illustrates the common law rule, incorporated
into the Florida code, that stockholders have a preemptive
right to subscribe to unissued stock unless the corporate
charter provides otherwise.0 9 A division of opinion having
arisen between majority and minority stockholders, the
latter, who had a majority on the board of directors, sold
unissued stock to one of their number and changed the
balance of power. The former majority stockholder brought
a bill in equity to cancel the stock. The defendants charged
plaintiff with using his power as a majority stockholder
to advance his own interests at the expense of the corpora-
tion. The court ruled that this was no defense to an order
directing cancellation, although it might at a later stage
of the litigation justify other orders against plaintiff.
TORTS. Except for a case recognizing, apparently for
the first time in Florida, an action for slander of title,
the cases for the current quarter illustrate applications of
established principles. Owner of property to business in-
vitee. Two cases dealt with the duty of the person in con-
trol of real property to persons coming upon the premises
in the occupant's interest. While a very high duty of care
is provided safe premises is imposed, the owner is not an
insurer. If he knows, or should have known, of a dangerous
condition and has not taken steps to correct it, he may be
liable for resulting injury. Thus, where the operator of a
dog racing track which was crowded, on the occasion of
races, with patrons to whom bottled goods were sold in
quantity, made no provision to collect empty bottles, it was
error to direct a verdict for the operator in an action for
personal injuries, sustained when a patron tripped upon
lo8 Francesehint v. Sigynond, 36 So. 2d 371 (Fla., 1948).
io9 Rowland v. Times Publishing Co., 35 So. 2d 399 (Fla., 1948).
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an empty bottle lying on the floor."0 The court below held
that the patron must show that the specific bottle had been
there long enough for the operator to have found and re-
moved it. On the other hand, the mere falling of a coco-
nut frond, not shown to have been in a dangerous con-
dition for an appreciable time before the accident, was
not sufficient to charge a municipality with liability to a
person sitting on a bench in a public park when it fell,
and a verdict was properly directed in favor of the city."'
Causation. In cases of negligence, it is necessary to show
that the injury upon which action is brought, was the prox-
imate result of the negligent act. Except where the rule
of res ipsa loquitur applies, failure to show causal connec-
tion is fatal to plaintiff's claim. Where a contractor build-
ing a public road cut a cattleman's fence and negligently
failed to repair it, and some of the cattleman's stock was
found dead upon the highway, recovery could be had, not
for the total number of cattle found on inventory to be
missing from the herd, but only for the cattle specifically
accounted for."2
Trespass by user of public way. The case last mentioned
also illustrates the rule that the privilege of the public to
use a way does not immunize persons from liability for
damage caused adjoining or subjacent owners by a negli-
gent or excessive use of the privilege. The contractor's plea
of privilege, in that he was constructing a public highway,
was not a defense to an action based on negligent failure
to replace 6r repair the fence. Similarly, the owner of a
successful restaurant business, which attracts large crowds
of patrons, may not use the sidewalk in front of his com-
petitor's premises as a waiting-room for those who cannot
be seated promptly. On second appeal,' a former holding
that the restauranteur must provide space upon his own
premises, was modified to permit him to control the crowds
on the sidewalk in such a way as to leave his competitor's
entrance open. While the court entered this order upon
the consent of the parties, it is apparent from the dis-
11o Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 35 So. 2d 720 (Fla., 1948).
111 Lisk v. City of West Palm Beach, 36 So. 2d 197 (Fla., 1948).
tZ m. J. Carroll Contracting Co. v. Smith, 35 So. 2d 385 (Fla., 1948).
113 Morrison Cafeteria Co. v. Shamhart, 35 So. 2d 842 (Fla., 1948).
(Vol.. 2
S)'NOPSIS
senting opinion that the court actually repealed its former
holding, which was much criticized. ' 4
Liability of motorist to guest: assumption of risk. A
Florida statute bars actions for ordinary negligence by a
non-paying guest transported in a motor vehicle,' but this
statute does not apply to school children on their way to
and from school. This exception was found to be applicable
in a current case;'" but in another, the effect of the statute
seems to have been completely overlooked."' The trial court,
having charged that the guest assumes the risk unless he
protests the negligent operation of the vehicle, reconsidered
and awarded a new trial. This was approved by the Supreme
Court, holding that it must appear that the guest had rea-
son to know that the car was being operated in a danger-
ous manner. Certainly the defense of assumption of risk
cannot be applied in a case of gross negligence.
Survival of actions. The statute which provides that all
actions for personal injuries shall die with the person,'
applies to death of the injured person, not of the tortfeasor.
This was established in a case in which the tortfeasor, hav-
ing severely injured and disfigured his victim in an attempt
to murder her, turned his pistol upon himself and com-
mitted suicide." 9
Master and servant. Notwithstanding the general sub-
stitution of workmens' compensation for the common law
actions in cases where an employee is injured in the course
of his employment, cases still arise in which the old-time
defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence
are applicable. One case, based entirely on the common law,
drew nice distinctions as to the extent of the risk assum-
ed.120 A workman whose employer was engaged by a public
utility to repair electric power lines damaged in a hurri-
cane, was severely injured when he came in contact with
an energized wire. The utility contended that since the
workman was sent to repair equipment known to have been
114 See note, 1 U. of Fla. L. R. 316 (1948).
115F. S. 1941, § 320.59.
116 Schwenck v. Jacobs, 35 So. 2d 128 (Fla., 1948).
117 Knudsen v. HanIan, 36 So. 2d 192 (Fla., 1948).
IIS F. S. 1941, § 45.11.
19 Necker v. Gallinger, 35 So. 2d 647 (Fla., 1948).
120 Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hargrove, 35 So. 2d 1 (Fla., 1948).
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daraged in the storm, he assumed the risk, and the case
was not one for the jury. The Supreme Court found, how-
ever, that the evidence permitted an inference that the
workman was injured, not because of trouble caused by the
hurricane, but because of faulty rigging when the line was
originally constructed. The Federal Employers' Liability
Act has made contributory negligence a factor to be weigh-
ed toward mitigation of damages, not a complete defense
as it was at common law. On this basis, the court sustained
a very substantial award of damages to the widow of a rail-
roader killed in a yarding accident.' 2' The evidence showed
that the workman was negligent as well as the crew of the
engine that struck him. In the workmen's compensation
cases of the quarter, the court ruled that to benefit by the
extension of time which is accorded persons found to be
"mentally incompetent," a claimant may show that fol-
lowing a head injury, he was unable to manage his ordinary
business affairs and to provide for his family as formerly.2 2
The father, brothers, and sisters of a deceased deaf mute, a
minor, who turned back half his earnings to his mother
to share the expenses of the home in which he lived, failed
to show an obligation of the decedent, voluntarily or other-
wise assumed, to support them, and thus did not prove a
case of dependency. 23 The mother had already been allowed
to claim as a dependent. When all the medical testimony is
to the effect that the claimant has recovered, but the claim-
ant himself testifies that that is not the case, there is evi-
dence to support a finding of the deputy commissioner that
the disability is continuing.2 4
Damages in tort cases. Verdicts of $25,000 121 to the widow
of a railroad yard worker and $50,00026 to an electric line-
man, who lost his right arm below the elbow, were held not
to be excessive, although based on inflated earnings. Justice
121 Loftin v. Saxon, 35 So. 2d 716 (1948).
122 Thomas v. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., 36 So. 2d
377 (Fla., 1948).
123 Sherman v. Florida Tar & Creosote Co., 36 So. 2d 267 (Fla., 1948).
124 Florence Citrus Growers Association v. Parrish, 36 So. 2d 369
(Fla., 1948).
125 Loftin v. Saxon, 35 So. 2d 716 (Fla., 1948).
126 Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hargrove, 35 So. 2d 1 (Fla., 1948).
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Terrell, finding that the lineman, who had not been edu-
cated beyond the fourth grade and had no training which
would be adaptable in any other field, was earning $6500
annually, said wisely: "The Judge who overlooks the fact
that the lineman, the yard man, the plumber and the cook,
are made of the same common clay that he is, is not equip-
ped to do so."
Slander of title. One case decided during this period de-
serves extensive study.127 The plaintiff, a builder and de-
veloper, contracted to build a house on a certain lot of land
which he owned, and thereafter to convey the land to one
of the defendants. The defendants added their names to
the writing as witnesses and caused it to be recorded, al-
though this was not contemplated by the plaintiff, who
brought an action for damages. The lower court sustained
a demurrer; but the Supreme Court remanded the case,
holding that a cause of action for false statements tending
to disparage the quality or title of land, had been stated.
The false statement in suit was the contract actually signed
by the contractor, and the recording was the act which
constituted publication. It is hard to see where any falsity
enters the picture, and the next appeal will be eagerly
awaited.
THE FAMILY. Divorce. No quarter would be complete
without a number of divorce cases; but it appears that
novel and important questions of law in that field remain
undecided. A valuable restatement of the distinction be-
tween the award of alimony and property settlements is
made in one case, 2 which has been discussed in detail
above.' 29 The existence of a decree for separate mainten-
ance in another state does not deprive a court of jurisdic-
tion to award a divorce; but dismissal of the petition may
be justified by the existence of such a decree. A recent
case, in which a husband petitioned for divorce in Florida
after his wife had secured a decree for separate mainten-
ance in New York, settles some controversial points of
great importance.3 0 The wife did not appear, but wrote
'27 Lehman v. Goldin, 36 So. 2d 259 (Fla., 1948).
'28 Welsh v. Welsh, 35 So. 2d 6 (Fla., 1948).
129 See above under title "Equity: Constructive Trusts."
130 Bernstein v. Bernstein, 36 So. 2d 190 (Fla., 1948).
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to the circuit judge in Florida, through her attorneys in
New York, apprising him of the facts. The circuit judge
issued writ of ne exeat against the husband, adjudicated
him in contempt, and dismissed the petition with prejudice!
The Supreme Court found that the circuit judge had power
to act on the wife's letter without an appearance, but quash-
ed the contempt order and reinstated the petition, holding
that since the prior proceedings were matters of defense,
the husband was under no duty to the court to disclose
them in his petition. In another case it was shown that a
husband had brought an action for divorce in 1926, at
which time an order for temporary alimony was entered.'3 '
In 1946, the wife appeared, asserting that the husband,
now residing in another state, had been in default since
1926, and seeking a judgment for the payments in default.
The court ordered publication of notice in the newspapers,
and entered judgment in default of an appearance. On ap-
plication of the husband, the Supreme Court applied the
rule that a decree for alimony cannot be entered where
service on the other party is by publication only, treating
this case as one of original process; but it avoided deciding
whether or not it was original process by holding the notice
insufficient for other purposes in that it did not state the
time and place of hearing in violation of a rule requiring
parties to be notified.
Cancellation of antenuptial contract for fraud. While
sterility of the wife is not a ground for divorce or annul-
ment, the concealment of the fact that a woman is sterile at
time of marriage, if it is known to the wife, and if the
procurement of issue is of the essence of the contract, may
constitute such fraud as would justify annulment of the
marriage and recission of an antenuptial settlement.
Whether or not the wife knew she was sterile is a question
of fact for the chancellor or master, and if there is legally
sufficient evidence to support his finding, it is conclusive.132
Custody of children. In one case, the Supreme Court re-
viewed the record made below in an habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, wherein a widowed mother who had left her child
* 131 Peacock v. Peacock, 36 So. 2d 206 (Fla., 1948).
132 Ball v. Ball, 36 So. 2d 172 (Fla., 1948).
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with her first husband's parents, sought to recover custody
from them. 3 This is not, however, a holding that custody
cannot be awarded to the mother if that would be in the best
interest of the child, as the headnote would seem to indicate.
This was not a case of custody following divorce, but the
problem is the same."14
Adoption. Some interesting problems were raised and
answered rather inconclusively in an adoption case.'35 After
a home was found for the child with the consent of the
natural parent and the state welfare board had made a
favorable report, the adopting mother died pending the
final decree. The court below believing that adoption by a
single man would be improper, dismissed the case, and the
husband appealed. The Supreme Court was sympathetic,
but it had the advantage of hindsight, for the husband re-
married pending the appeal! It remanded the case with in-
structions to investigate the suitability of the new home.
Meanwhile the natural mother had withdrawn her consent;
so this case constitutes a holding that once consent has been
filed, it may not be withdrawn.
ADJECTIVAL LAW
CONFLICTS OF LAW. While the courts of one state are
bound by the federal constitution to accord full faith and
credit to decrees in divorce rendered by another, provided
it has acquired jurisdiction over one of the parties, there
is no corresponding prohibition against a collateral attack
on a separate maintenance decree. The Supreme Court has
recognized this, holding that a circuit judge may consider
the existence of such a decree as a matter of defense, but not
as depriving him of jurisdiction.'36 In a case involving juris-
diction to administer an estate, in which the states of Cali-
fornia and Florida intervened to preserve their relative
tax interests, the record showed that the deceased, a long
time resident of Florida, had gone to California on a visit
shortly before his death, which occurred in California. 3 7
133 State ex rel Hicks v. Cain, 36 So. 2d 275 (Fla., 1948).
134- See Leo M. and LOUISE A. ALPERT, Custody Incident to Divorce in
Florida, 2 Miami L. Q. 32, and Note, 2 Miami L. Q. 184.
135 In re McDaniel, 35 So. 2d 585 (Fla., 1948).
136 Bernstein v. Bernstein, 36 So. 2d 190 (Fla., 1948).
137 Miller v. Nelson, 35 So. 2d 288 (Fla., 1948).
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His will, which was admitted to probate, described him as
a resident of California. Testator was an aged man, sub-
ject to considerable influence on the part of his housekeeper.
The Supreme Court stated the rule of law to be, that where
an established domicile is shown, there is a presumption
that it continues. This places the burden of proof upon one
asserting change to show the intent to change, including
the mental capacity to entertain that intent. In the light
of this rule, it found that the county judge's findings were
supported by competent evidence, with the result that the
record displays one of those nice paradoxes, understand-
able only by the initiate: that testator had the capacity to
make the will in which he described himself as a resident
of California; but that at the same time, he did not have
the capacity to decide where to make his home. In any
event, determination of domicile is largely a matter of re-
solving conflicts in testimony, and if there is evidence to
support the findings of the trier of facts, the findings
should be sustained on appeal. A similar question is pre-
sented when there is a dispute within the state as to the
county in which the estate should be administered.138
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. Two interesting decisions
were rendered during the quarter in which the court ex-
amined the nature and character of the judicial function.
One of these involved the compensation of masters in chanc-
ery." The court held that in some cases, the master is en-
titled to receive more than the statutory rate14 of compen-
sation, but that it is not proper to consider the financial
ability of the parties, or duties assumed by the master over
and beyond those required by law. In an uncontested di-
vorce, the master, a man of considerable age and experience,
was allowed a fee of $750, his report showing that there
had been several hearings, innumerable conferences with
the parties and their counsel, .a settlement reached through
the master's patient and untiring efforts, and that the de-
fendant, a physician, enjoyed a large income. The court
not only held $750 excessive, but said that the case justified
138 In re Lorenzo's Estate, 35 So. 2d 587 (Fla., 1948).
139 Cohn v. Cohn, 36 So. 2d 199 (Fla., 1948).
140 F. S. 1941, § 62.07.
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nothing more than the statutory rate. We estimate that
this would be about $5.00, based on the above statment, and
treating some of the conferences as hearings. The situation
would be different in the case of a guardian ad item, who
is responsible for the value of the amount in litigation, and
whose function is not judicial; but the master in chancery
is performing a judicial function, and it is fundamental
that justice shall not be sold. The case does call attention,
however, to the fact that there is considerable disparity be-
tween the value placed upon a lawyer's services by the
legislature and that placed upon a physician's by the pub-
lic. If it is too much to ask the parties to pay the master
what his time is worth, the state should assume the expense.
In another case it was ruled that where no answer is
filed in a divorce proceeding, but the court was informed
by letter that there was an outstanding decree for separate
maintenance in another state in favor of petitioner's wife,
a nonresident, the court had power of its own motion,
without an appearance, to require further evidence and to
consider this defense. 14 1 It thus appears that a court is not
limited in its powers because a case is not defended, even
where a decree based upon default would be unassailable.
This ruling is made of the same stuff that permits the
court to summon witnesses, rule on the admissibility of
testimony, and direct a verdict, all of its own motion. The
record in the particular case illustrates a danger which is
always present when the court exercises this power: the
line between judge and advocate is too easily crossed. The
court below in the zeal of advocacy found the petitioner
guilty of contempt. When this situation arises, the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem would offer a more practical
solution. The power of a court to protect the members of
its own bar against the machinations of ungrateful, non-
resident clients, is asserted to be "implied" in another
case. 142 Viewed however as a holding that a court of equity,
having through control of a trustee the practical custody
of a fund in one proceeding, may consolidate in rem and
quasi in rem proceedings against that particular fund in
the same proceeding, the holding is more plausible.
141 Bernstein v. Bernstein, 36 So. 2d 191 (Fla., 1948).
142 In re Warner's Estate, 35 So. 2d 296 (Fla., 1948).
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EVIDENCE. Presumptions and burden of proof. One case
in the field of evidence involved the use of presumptions to
establish the burden of proof.'43 It involved the determina-
tion of the domicile of a long time resident of Florida who
had gone to California and declared himself to be a resi-
dent thereof. The court ruled, that when an established
domicile has been shown, the burden is upon the party
asserting change to show the requisite intent. This burden
was held to include proof of the requisite capacity to form
such an intent. It would seem, however, that the existence
of the intent was shown, and the real issue was whether
or not the capacity existed, and on that issue, the pre-
sumption of sanity would place the burden of proof on the
party challenging capacity. It was entirely unnecessary to
enter upon this speculation, because there was evidence on
each issue to support a finding in favor of either party by
the county judge. Judicial notice. The raising of cattle
being an important industry in this state, the court knows
judicially that range cattle do not leave the range unless
they are driven away. 4
Admissibility dependent on findings of court. Where the
admissibility of evidence depends on the determination of
facts not material to the issue, it is the function of the trial
judge to make that determination, and his ruling, if based
on competent evidence, must be sustained. Where the state
attorney prepared a written statement to be signed by a
dying witness, victim of the alleged crime, and included a
statement that there was knowledge of impending death,
this was competent, when supported by the testimony
of a physician that the witness was in extremis and did die
shortly thereafter, to admit the statement as a dying de-
claration. 45 Confessions. The use of a confession is not
sufficient to support a conviction unless there is other proof
of the corpus delicti; but when in addition to confessions
of arson, the fire chief testified that he found evidence
of the use of kerosene to start the fire and saw the accused
at the scene during the fire, this requirement was held to
143 Miller v. Nelson, 35 So. 2d 288 (Fla., 1948).
144 M. J. Carroll Contracting Co. v. Smith, 35 So. 2d 385 (Fla.. 1948).
145 Simmons v. State, 36 So. 2d 262 (Fla., 1948).
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be satisfied.1" The confessions of an accomplice cannot be
admitted to prove the guilt of the principal unless made in
his presence; but failure of counsel to object seasonably
will result in a waiver. 147 In a case where the principal and
his accessories were tried jointly, such confessions were
offered. They could not be excluded when offered, because
they were competent as to some of the defendants; there-
fore counsel had recourse only to a request to charge that
they could not be considered as against the principal. He
failed to do this, and was held to have waived his right.
Evidence of other crimes. Evidence that the accused has
committed other crimes is ordinarily not admissible to prove
that he has committed a particular crime; but this rule
admits of exceptions where motive, identity of the accused,
or a course of conduct are material. In one case, the court
admitted evidence to show that within a few days immed-
iately preceding and following an alleged rape, accused
attacked or attempted to rape four other women in the
area, and that his method of approach in each case was
the same.' This case is to be contrasted with another in
which it was alleged that the defendant in a prosecution
for bigamy, had forged a certified copy of a decree of di-
vorce offered in evidence.' 9 On cross examination of the
defendant, the state over objection brought out that he had
been convicted of forgery. The court ruled that while a
defendant may be asked if he has ever been convicted of
crime, he may not be asked of what crime unless it is per-
jury. Taken together, these two cases illustrate the rule
and its exceptions.
Entries made in the course of a business. The admission
of the reports of a credit rating agency to prove that a
prospective purchaser of real property was able to pur-
chase, was approved in another case. 50 The evidence is
clearly hearsay, since the persons who compiled the report
are not present, and they have only compiled data which
146 Miles v. State, 36 So. 2d 182 (Fla., 1948).
147 McDowell v. State, 36 So. 2d 180 (Fla., 1948).
148 Talley v. State, 36 So. 2d 201 (Mta., 1948).
149 Steese v. State, 36 So. 2d 212 (Fla., 1948).
150 Perper v. Edell, 35 So. 2d 387 (Fla., 1948).
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they have obtained by hearsay; but as a new departure in
the law, courts have admitted similar reports in the belief
that the regularity of the course of business in which they
are compiled gives some measure of credibility to them.
This case may be regarded as a big step forward in the law
of evidence.
